Title in Chinese: 国家宗教事务局 (guójiā zōngjiào shìwù jú)
Founded: 1951
Headquarters: Houhai Beiyan, Shichahai, Xicheng, Beijing 100009, China
Website: sara.gov.cn (2015 archive)
China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), initially entitled the Bureau of Religious Affairs, was established as a central ministry under the State Council (the highest Central Government organ), with local offices, to oversee and regulate the religious affairs of China’s estimated 500 million believers. It was originally an important source of administrative guidance by the Chinese government, working in tandem with the ideological guidance provided by the CCP via its United Front Work Department (UFWD). SARA has played an active role in managing ethnic and religious minorities, particularly in Tibet.
In March 2018 SARA was incorporated directly into the UFWD, meaning that it was converted from a "State agency" to a Communist Party entity, a part of the UFWD’s Second Bureau. SARA continues to exercise control over religious appointments, but in the name of the Party instead of the Government. The institution has since been re-branded as the National Religious Affairs Administration.
SARA exercises tight control the selection of clergy, and the interpretation of religious doctrine. Mirroring the control exercised over state-owned companies in China, the Chinese government administers all religious sites, adherents and religious activities. Through SARA, religion in China is essentially a state-run enterprise managed by the Communist Party.
SARA is responsible for registering venues for religious activities and conducting inspections of them. It oversees and controls China’s five officially sanctioned “patriotic” religious organisations, the largest being the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), working to ensure that the registered religious organisations support and carry out the policy priorities of the Communist Party. To an extent, SARA can be considered to hold a function similar to the Vatican’s “Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei“ (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the new name of the former "Holy Inquisition" administration), however its scope is wider than Vatican’s because it covers more than one religion, and the “faith” it concerns is subordination to Party Doctrine.
The five patriotic associations were formed as a result of the Party’s fear of foreign influence and organised opposition which could destabilise the Chinese state. The associations separate Chinese religious believers from foreign coreligionists such as the Vatican for Catholics and the Dalai Lama for Buddhists. The formation of SARA addressed the authorities’ concern over the ageing and depleting number of Chinese religious leaders. The Party moulds religious leaders in its image to counter influences from outside China.
SARA is also charged with authorising religious professionals. In practice, SARA cadres often tap politically loyal figures within religious circles, or SARA may even appoint its own cadres to leadership positions within the patriotic religious organisations. Every year, SARA gathers hundreds of delegates from various patriotic religious organisations from within the country and abroad, for a briefing known as the "Religious Figures Tea Party". Anyone who is accredited and promoted by SARA is considered to adhere to the goals of the Party and therefore to be a controlled agent.
In Chinese-controlled Tibet, SARA regulates the reincarnation of "living Buddhas" and vets temples that handle such reincarnations, affirming the illegality of reincarnations taking place without state approval. The mechanism by which this is enforced is the famous 2007 State Religious Affairs Bureau Order No. 5 which limits foreign influence and is widely assumed to establish Beijing’s authority to recruit the next Dalai Lama. However SARA was already active in Tibet in accrediting the PRC's own selection of the 11th Panchen Lama Gyaincain Norbu in 1995. Having come of age and assumed political responsibilities, he now waits for the current Dalai Lama to pass away so he can chose the next one and fulfil the destiny the Chinese authorities groomed him for from childhood.
The work of SARA is not limited to the national territory of the PRC, but expands wherever its interests are at stake, especially in connection with the management of overseas Chinese (which officially includes all exiled Tibetans). Overseas, SARA extends its influence within the Chinese diaspora and in programmes of diplomatic outreach. SARA officials can regularly be seen in Taiwan in "cross-strait" initiatives, as well as in neighbouring countries such as Nepal and India, or as far afield as Canada and Australia in connection with the promotion of China's soft power.
SARA’s use of Tibetan clerics as an instrument of China’s soft power has developed in sophisticated ways. Perhaps the most prominent overseas figure accredited by SARA is the Tibetan religious leader Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje. Even many years after his exfiltration from China into India, his cooperation with SARA has been continuous, working with its envoys on China's hegemonic project to merge Tibetan Buddhism into its CCP-compliant Han counterpart.
Directory of Officials and Organizations in China, Volume 1 Malcolm Lamb (2003)
Xuan Zang Memorial Hall in India. China Pictorial (2007-02)
A Crisis of Faith, Liu Peng, China Security, Vol. 4 No. 4 (Autumn 2008)
Religious Figures Tea Party: 2010; 2011; 2012 (SARA)
SARA 60th anniversary website, SARA (archive 2011)
China’s measures to appoint political monks, TCHRD (2013-07-05)
SARA delegation to India and Nepal, Sohu (2015-04-14)
China Launches Living-Buddha Authentication Site, Dalai Lama Not Included, WSJ (2016-01-19)