Except during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, Han Buddhism has been promoted by the Chinese authorities as the continuity of “Humanistic Buddhism”, a reformist doctrinal view theorised by Master Taixu (1890-1947). This revivalist approach of adapting Chinese Buddhism to new modern values of science and progress allowed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to re-shape it and extend its theories into other Buddhist traditions, including the Tibetan “Vajrayana”. In order to prove the compatibility of Buddhist doctrine with scientific and modern trends, Taixu theorised his doctrinal view in two steps, echoing Confucian “humaneness” (仁 ; rén ): he first introduced the term “Buddhism for human life” (人生佛教 ; rénshēng fójiào ) and “Buddhism for the human world” (人間佛教; rénjiān fójiào ). 

Taixu passed away before the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), so the task would fall to his tireless student Zhao Puchu (1907-2000). Zhou, a founding member of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) worked to implement these doctrines as a political component of the PRC program by involving the Buddhist practitioners in the formation of a modern, wealthy and powerful Chinese socialist society, always under the strict command and control of the CCP. After the civil war, Zhao, a prolific author, resolved to perform his great task of merging Buddhism into Communism.

Even the Cultural Revolution would not stop him. He would perceive the forced return of monks to lay life, and the prohibition of all the traditional forms of Buddhism, as a mere transitory experience. He remained confident in the Buddhist revival despite the massive destruction of temples and countless Buddhist texts and relics. Immediately after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, he began to advise the CCP on how to formally allow the resumption of nationwide religious activities. In the decades that followed, Zhao oversaw the construction of a religious Communist framework, within which Buddhism would be moulded and controlled. This was made possible due to the relevant theoretical concepts that he developed from the beginning, combined with the proper bodies of indoctrination and supervision that he reactivated after 1976.

This was the case for the BAC (established in 1953), as well as for the “Seminar for Buddhism” (中國 佛 學院) that he co-founded in 1956 (later renamed the “Chinese Buddhist Academy”) and the China Advanced Institute of Tibetan Buddhism, which he founded in 1987. In parallel with the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), these institutions would become the main instruments of Buddhist governmental management, and to produce an elite of clerics, motivated to promote full submission to the CCP’s policies and its related business projects as a Buddhist moral imperative.

The BAC is the representative association for Buddhism in the Chinese state, placed under the authority of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), the Party organ that supervises all non-Party social groups. Its basic tasks are to support the implementation of religious policy and heighten Buddhists’ awareness of socialism and patriotism. SARA, formerly under the State Council (but since 2018 directly under the UFWD) exercises control over religious appointments, the selection of clergy, and the interpretation of religious doctrine. It also works to ensure that registered religious organisations support and carry out the policy priorities of the CCP.

As Buddhism has spread under the BAC’s guidance, its profound theoretical system of religious thinking and compassion has been adapted to the philosophy of “harmony” (和谐; héxié) within Chinese culture and Chinese values. SARA’s former Director Ye Xiaowen said in 2006 “The ‘harmonious world’ theory… will help dispel doubts in the international community about China’s continued development and refute the absurd China threat theory,” and “It is desirable for Buddhist affairs to help civilian rule”… with Chinese characteristics.

Starting in the Deng Xiaoping era, the CCP realised the importance of the cultural and religious issue and adopted a two-pronged strategy: to ally and to regulate. They kept tight control on ideology while compromising with, absorbing and supporting other mainstream ideologies – including those of the functional religious organisations – with the goal to engage religion in a Han cultural hegemony. In the case of Buddhism this involved the merger of the “Three Language System” (三大语系佛教; sān dà yǔxì fójiào); the Mandarin Mahayana, the Tibetan Vajrayana and the Pali Theravada, and the development of a Han Buddhist system of study and practice. This meaning is that this merger is subordinated to the Han system, bearing in mind that Tibetan and Pali relate also to ethnic minorities among the Chinese population.

The work of the "Patriotic" religious organisations such as the BAC is not limited to the national territory of the PRC, but expands wherever its interests are at stake, especially in connection with the overseas Chinese, the exiled Tibetans being officially included in this category.

Buddhism is the cement of Tibetan identity; a feature of particular note is devotion to the spiritual masters: lamas. These lamas are organised in a subtle hierarchy with the heads of the great traditional lineages at the top, with some recognised as “tulkus” (reincarnations) by their peers. Inside Tibet, only the Chinese authorities have the right and power to decide who is a reincarnated lama and grant them the status of “Living Buddha” (活佛; huófó), a title that necessarily implies being part of an acknowledged Chinese hierarchy.

What all these lamas have in common is that they are respected and revered in a powerful relationship of spiritual allegiance (even at the risk of manipulation and the abuse of power, which is difficult to counteract). In contrast, the relationship between Chinese Buddhists and their Han clerics, while very respectful, is much less devoted. So, it took some time for the authorities in Beijing to get the measure of this difference between Tibetan and Han Buddhism, but finally they realised that if the true allegiance of the hierarchical Tibetan Buddhists were to be harnessed to Han Buddhism, the entire community could be shifted towards a spiritual devotion to the Chinese motherland. For this aim, a subtle and complex religious doctrinal merging process of the Han and Tibetan Schools had to be organised, with a superior rank given to Han Buddhism.

Many lamas, both in Tibet and in exile, have successfully put this to the test through the gradual merger of the two versions of Buddhism. Thus, in recent years, one can see Tibetan and Himalayan lamas assuming the ways of Han monks while at the same time introducing them to Tibetan practices. This political ecumenism has worked superbly, provided that the “face” of Tibetans (who consider their brand of Buddhism superior to the Chinese version) is not threatened. So as long as the hierarchies show mutual respect, and the donations flow, some influential lamas play the game.

This means that the monk envoys of the Chinese regime, who communicate directly with and ultimately convey the overseas lamas into Chinese accreditation, are able to take advantage of all channels of influence, e.g. within the exile Tibetan community. By the same token, the new generation of Tibetan lamas born, brought up and approved in China, benefit from the reflected glory of a community that went into exile with the Dalai Lama, in preaching a Sino-compatible Buddhist message in Asia, the U.S., Europe and beyond.

An example of this process taking place in Mainland China is from 2007 in Shenzen's Hongfa Temple. Here, the "Living Buddha" Dongbao Zhongba, an ethnic Tibetan religious civil servant from Yunnan, donned the cassock of a Han monk and took vows from the famous Chinese abbot Ben Huan, who was then guardian of the Mainland religious policy in his capacity as BAC Honorary President. This unprecedented event was broadcast with the accompanying explanation “Chinese Buddhism is a complete system, consisting of three parts: the Chinese Buddhist transmission, Tibetan Buddhism and Southern Buddhism” and that “this mutual cultural exchange has made outstanding contributions to maintaining national unity and national development.”

Overseas, this strategy had already started playing out as early as 1997 with Master Hsin Tao, a prominent figure in Taiwan where he has established (with Beijing's support) a syncretic touristico-religious complex in called Lingbi Mountain (靈鷲山). Hsin Tao, Burmese by birth but most loyal to Han Buddhism, is accredited by SARA for the spread of the socialist Humanistic Buddhist revival. He employed the same techniques as others would later on, i.e. being empowered by Tibetan Vajrayana lamas of the highest possible rank, then imposing his will of transformation towards the Han system, based on the unbreakable tantric commitments that Tibetans are accustomed to be bound by, and finally taking the lead over them. 

An even more prominent role has been played by Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje, even while under strict control by Indian security, in his flamboyant adoption of Han Buddhist rituals. For example, around 2010-11 he introduced the Han Mahayana practice of “Akshobhya Fire Puja,” for which his Tibetan followers were required to learn and recite texts in Chinese.

The most remarkable example however, has been the worship of "Guan Gong". This Chinese Taoist-Confucianist protective deity (also known as "Guan Yu" and "Sangharama") is a quintessential symbol of the Chinese order, so much so that it is present in the police stations of China and Taiwan. Ogyen Trinley Dorje has declared Guan Gong to be connected with the Tsurphu Monastery, ancestral home of the Karmapas in Tibet. Guan Gong has also been promoted by the senior Tibetan mentor of Ogyen Trinley Dorje, Thrangu Rinpoche, who announced in 2008 that the ritual is for “fostering closer relationship between the Tibetans and the Han Chinese.” Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje first publicly invoked this Chinese “protector” of police affairs in March 2011, precisely at the time when he and several of his aides first came under scrutiny by Indian justice, having been summoned to appear in court on charges of corruption and conspiracy.

Guan Gong has become a new cult imposed in the centres and monasteries of Ogyen Trinley Dorje's Kagyu sect. The wish of Ogyen Trinley Dorje to see his sect's traditions absorbed by Chinese standards went even to the point of dressing himself in Han monk uniform and accepting for the picture to be disseminated and venerated in Han Buddhist temples.

This development reached its apotheosis in February 2016 during Ogyen Trinley Dorje's "Kagyu Monlam", the grand theatrical prayer festival held annually in Bodhgaya, India. Here, before a congregation of ten thousand and broadcast throughout the Chinese speaking world, an effigy of Guan Gong was enshrined on stage as the master deity, while Ogyen Trinley Dorje and his mentor in Han Buddhism of many years Master Hai Tao jointly presided over a deeply symbolic ritual (with the former clad in a fusion of Han and Tibetan monastic garb). Participants were guided to recite the liturgy, displayed via massive screens in both Tibetan and Chinese languages. The full production video can be viewed below.

Now a number of China-accredited Humanistic Han monks have been anointed by “approved” Tibetan and Himalayan lamas such as Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje and travel to bless Tibetan diaspora communities worldwide. In short, Beijing is on the point of harvesting the devotional potential of the not only the Tibetans, but even their Western benefactors - like ripe fruit. Ogyen Trinley Dorje is playing a vital role in this. He speaks and writes fluent Mandarin, he has never returned his BAC membership card, and neither SARA nor the United Front have yet withdrawn their support for him. He is thus the first diaspora Tibetan leader to include specifically Han rituals in ancient Tibetan practices, and his disciples follow unflinchingly.

Regarding Ogyen Trinley Dorje, observers have taken it for granted that the aim of the Chinese authorities in their appointment of the young Karmapa was for him to play a similar political role as the 11^th Panchen Lama Gyaincain Norbu. This is also one of the official reasons his entourage raised when he had to justify his presence in India the first days of the new millennium, i.e. he didn’t want to be a puppet of the Chinese regime. But this conceals the long-term goal expressed by the Chinese leadership for the conditions of the Buddhist revival as explained above: it should be merged within the Han system. What does this mean? With Han ethnics being both the majority of the people and the exclusive ultimate leaders of the PRC, this rule should also apply to the “Three Language Buddhism” and therefore, the Tibetan Vajrayana must be gradually subordinated to the Han Mahayana in order to comply with its contribution to the “Socialist Spiritual civilisation”.