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Karmapa is a title that has been conferred on successive heads of the influential Karma Kagyu sect of Tibetan Buddhism since the 12^th Century. Ogyen Trinley Dorje is a holder of this title and as such is regarded as one of the highest-ranking clerics in the Tibetan religious hierarchy.

The story of Ogyen Trinley Dorje is a complex issue due to the well-constructed narrative of his recognition as 17^th in the line of Karmapa incarnations and subsequent escape from Tibet. This narrative rest on three pillars: firstly, the anticipation of a new, 17^th Karmapa by the devotees of the late 16^th Karmapa (1924-81); secondly, Ogyen Trinley Dorje having been legitimised by somebody who is above suspicion of lying (i.e. the Dalai Lama); and thirdly, Ogyen Trinley Dorje being presented to the world (and in particular the Western media) as a potential successor to the Dalai Lama.

However, it is possible to understand this story in a deeper and more coherent way through the analysis of open sources. It is a matter of posing some key questions and then being able to cross-reference various facts openly available in the public domain. Doing so shows that the narrative of Ogyen Trinley Dorje has indeed been built up deliberately and purposefully; this very fact is the key to deconstructing it.

The questions that need to be asked concerning the narrative are (a) what are the geopolitical interests at stake and who are the actors involved at the political level; and (b) how, and by whom has any crisis or disruption in the narrative been managed?

This necessitates an inventory of the relevant disruptions, including their associated transgressions, anomalies and abnormalities. This follows below.

Appointment by Tai Situ 

In order for the appointment of Ogyen Trinley Dorje as the 17^th Karmapa in Tibet in September 1992 to have been possible, collaboration was necessary between the high-ranking Kagyu lama Tai Situ (b. 1954) and the Chinese government. It was during the winter of 1984-85 that Tai Situ made his first – and very active – return to Tibet since being taken into exile as a child. His visit lasted around four months, during which he was never free of tight Chinese control and scrutiny.

While rumour has it that Tai Situ met personally with Deng Xiaoping, what is known for certain is that he was received in Beijing by United Front Work Department (UFWD) head Yang Jingren, the architect of the UFWD’s 1983 policy aimed at securing support and cooperation from abroad. He was also welcomed by the politically rehabilitated 10^th Panchen Lama (1938-1989) and Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (1910-2009), Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People's Congress and Deputy Commander of the Tibet Military Area Command (renowned for having signed the “17-point agreement” in 1951 that surrendered Tibet to China).

Even though he would be discreet in the media, Ngapoi was fully involved in the process of Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s appointment. This was not only due to his political rank, but also because of his family links; he was the grandfather of Jamgon Kongtrul III (1954-1992). The fact that Kongtrul was one of the closest disciples of the late 16^th Karmapa and a member of the “regency” team was critical in terms of the information that he could exchange with his powerful grandfather. Such was the possible frame, at least during all the time Kongtrul had been an ally to Tai Situ. In April 1992 Kongtrul was killed in a car accident - the cause of which was never resolved - at the very point he started to break ranks with Tai Situ concerning the choice of the forthcoming 17^th Karmapa, and just after his car had been examined by an employee of then Chief Minister of Sikkim, Nar Bahadur Bhandari (1940-2017), another ally to Tai Situ.

In 1991, while inaugurating the Jangchub Choeling Monastery in Pokhara (Nepal), another high-ranking Kagyu lama, the late 14^th Shamarpa (1952-2014) officially announced that Trinley Thaye Dorje (b. 1983), a young boy residing in Tibet, was the 17^th Karmapa, “traditionally chosen” with no Chinese interference. This choice was soon confirmed by the Karmapa Charitable Trust (KCT), the legal body created by the 16^th Karmapa to administer his estate. This greatly displeased Tai Situ and his backers, including the Dalai Lama’s administration.

With the young Trinley Thaye Dorje being still being resident in Lhasa, Tai Situ knew the boy would not be enthroned before leaving Tibet, due to the fact that Shamarpa did not want to enter into any collaboration with the CCP that would otherwise be imposed by Beijing. Nevertheless, time was of the essence for Tai Situ, who was determined to overtake Shamarpa in the race to an enthronement. Here, Tai Situ collaborated with Beijing to have the boy selected by the CCP and (with his subsequent approval) enthroned more quickly inside Tibet. But Tibet was still under de facto martial law since the turn of 1989, notwithstanding the announcement that it was lifted a year before. This is why Tai Situ had to fly to Tibet in 1991 again to resume his final negotiations with Beijing (now - mainly through Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme and UFWD officials).

Regarding the rules of selection that had to be followed, the story of a sudden discovery of the late 16^th Karmapa’s famous “prediction letter” was almost certainly staged at the request of Beijing, which needed to reference “traditional Kagyu belief patterns.” To comply with China’s own principle of freedom of religion it could not be the duty of any other than the religious parties themselves to define the appropriate selection rules, as long as they wouldn’t override the laws of the State. As SARA Order No. 5 would later summarise it in 2007: “The government only manages religious affairs related to the interests of the State and the public and does not interfere with pure internal religious affairs.”

Regarding selections for the Dalai Lama’s Gelug sect, Beijing already had the “Golden Urn” at its disposal, under the false pretence that this random draw had been the traditional method by which the Chinese Emperors had, since 1792, their final say on the appointments of the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama tulkus. But what about the Karma Kagyu sect - where and what were their selection rules? This question was likely put to Tai Situ, and the agreed answer became: a “prediction letter.” Here is how the CCP described it via its mouthpiece, Xinhua:

Was it as a result of his negotiations with Beijing that Tai Situ was on record evoking a prediction letter as early as 1989? This would explain why he had to wait until 1992 to release his document. In the intervening time, martial law had been imposed on Tibet following the riots of March 1989 and the turmoil of Tiananmen Square. This resulted in a complex game of musical chairs within the CCP's hexin lingdao (“nucleus of the leadership”) leading to the assumption of power by Jiang Zemin.

Tai Situ also had to find a suitable arrangement with the entity then known as the “Tibetan Government in Exile” (TGiE) in Dharamsala, especially due to the fact that the Dalai Lama was in a position to put pressure on Beijing, asking Jiang Zemin (already General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission at that point) to reopen negotiations. On 10 March 1991, the day of the 32^nd commemoration of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, the Dalai Lama publicly urged the Chinese government to respond in the near future. Because this action was unlikely to produce any effect in practice, he went one step further on 9 October 1991, declaring that he was ready to visit Tibet on the spot and communicate directly with the Tibetans.

Again, the Dalai Lama tried to open the door in December 1991, during the visit of Premier Li Peng to New Delhi. Dharamsala would have certainly asked Tai Situ not to interfere with Beijing during this year (1991), which proved not to be promising. In the meantime, Tai Situ had to manage his closest sponsors, such as the powerful pro-Beijing Taiwanese politician Chen Li-an.

The whole publicised process could only commence after Beijing had first permitted Tai Situ to take charge of the young nomad child called Abu Gaga (the future Karmapa), in March 1992. It was only following Beijing’s permission that Abu Gaga was given his religious name Ogyen Trinley Dorje by Tai Situ at the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, on 2 August 1992.

It was also only after the arrival of Ren Wuzhi, Director of the State Bureau of Religious Affairs in Tsurphu on 27 September 1992 and his conferral of the official state accreditation on the young boy, that the religious enthronement ceremony of Ogyen Trinley Dorje could proceed. The significance of such timing was of course much more than a mere administrative issue; it was prescribed in full accordance with the policy of Zhao Puchu (1907-2000), President of the state-controlled Buddhist Association of China (BAC), and as such in full subordination to Chinese power.

Ogyen Trinley Dorje was invited by the Beijing central power amid much publicity, to participate in the 45^th anniversary ceremony of National Day on 25 September 1994 with his family. He was received by Jiang Zemin (where Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme was also visible), Luo Gan (Secretary-General of the State Council), Li Ruihuan, (chairman of the CPPCC’s National Committee), as well as by Chen Xitong, Mayor of Beijing.

The whole BAC, including Zhao Puchu in person would welcome its new member during this 1994 visit to Beijing. Although no pictures are available online, an article published in the official BAC review “Fayin” (“Voice of Dharma”) explained that:

These officials were actually the team in charge of controlling (from Beijing) the day-to-day fate of Ogyen Trinley Dorje.

Appointment by the Dalai Lama

The Dalai Lama’s appointment of Ogyen Trinley Dorje proceeded through two steps: (i) the acknowledgement of Tai Situ’s recognition; and (ii) issuing a special seal entitled “Buktam Rinpoche.” The timing of this was interesting. On 9 June 1992, while in Brazil, the Dalai Lama asked his private office to issue a provisional statement of recognition in favour of Ogyen Trinley Dorje. Only three days later, his brother Gyalo Thondup was received in Beijing by Ding Guangen, then head of the UFWD. Was such a provisional statement from the Dalai Lama a condition for his brother’s visit? Nobody asked the question, but it is a fact that Dalai Lama decided to officially seal his recognition of Ogyen Trinley Dorje four days after this UFWD meeting, on 17 June 1992. It was also a way to play on two tables by simultaneously usurping control of the Karma Kagyu sect from the Shamarpa. The Tibetan community had no choice but to adopt this official stance, and all the media followed suit.

Another question rarely presented in parallel concerns the recognition of the 11^th Panchen Lama. The rumour spread that the 10^th Panchen Lama had been poisoned on the orders of Deng Xiaoping and under the supervision of Hu Jintao while in Lhasa, in 1989. Was the recognition of the 17^th Karmapa a bargaining chip for the 11^th Panchen Lama?

A further question yet to be explored is whether the Dalai Lama’s involvement in such a matter would have been possible outside of the context of his relationship with the U.S., and in particular its intelligence apparatus? It is instructive to examine the frame of geopolitical interests in which the Dalai Lama’s decision to recognise Ogyen Trinley Dorje took place.

United States

In 1992 the U.S. was governed under the administration of George H.W. Bush. Bush Snr. was respected as an “old friend of China,” a title usually reserved for communist sympathisers, or foreign dignitaries who made outstanding contributions to Beijing’s tumultuous relations with the outside world. Tasked with America’s “after-sales service” following Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China, Bush was the de facto ambassador to Beijing in the 1970s, a role which directly preceded his appointment as Director of the CIA. Later as U.S. President, he helped China to manage its foreign relations following the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989.

The Dalai Lama’s Nobel Peace Prize (awarded in December 1989 just months after Tiananmen Square) was supported by the U.S. Congress, whose stance towards China was much harsher than that of the Bush White House. Long before the official contributions to exiled Tibetans via the U.S. Congressional budget and the appearance of NGOs and U.S. ‘Soft Power’ operations such as USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy, it is well known that the CIA had provided covert funding for the exiled Tibetan movement and to the Dalai Lama directly for decades. It is inconceivable that in 1992 the Dalai Lama’s decision on such an important issue as the recognition of the 17^th Karmapa was personal and independent of U.S. intelligence. Most likely it was taken in coordination with the case officer or station chief under CIA Director Robert Gates (a Bush Snr. appointee).

India 

In 1992 India was governed by the administration of Narasimha Rao. Relations between India and the U.S. in the early 1990s were marked by contention over issues of nuclear proliferation and human rights violations. The Americans’ policy towards India had changed little since the end of the Cold War, and neither had their provision of military aid to Pakistan. Rao began border talks with China and chose to maintain a distance from the Dalai Lama in order to avoid aggravating Beijing. It is therefore unlikely the Dalai Lama would have sought approval from the Indian authorities to pursue the path he had taken with at least the clearance, if not direct instruction from the U.S.

Takeover of Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim

After the 1992 step was completed, Tai Situ had another important duty: to prepare for the arrival of Ogyen Trinley Dorje at Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim, the seat of the late 16^th Karmapa, where the famous Black Crown was under lock and key. Because Tai Situ agreed with his Chinese sponsors in promoting this religious relic as the essential power attribute of a Karmapa, he had no choice but to obtain possession of it. The problem was that Rumtek was still legally administered and owned by the Karmapa Charitable Trust (KCT), loyal to Shamarpa, according to the ranking established by the 16^th Karmapa. Hence, Tai Situ would not hesitate to use all means at his disposal, including violence, to take over this key asset.

Without entering into detail, and based only on local media and official reports, it appeared that after some previous acts of intimidation, Tai Situ arrived in Rumtek on 2 August 1993, with his monks (most of them from the Karma Kagyu monastery of Phodong), and some who were said to be Chinese dressed in Tibetan robes, to threaten the legitimate trustees of the monastery. The police force under Sikkim’s Chief Minister Nar Bahadur Bhandari helped him in his task. Tai Situ performed an unscheduled initiation and – based on the rule of religious commitment imposed on the initiates toward the lama in such context – he forced the monks to sign their approval of Ogyen Trinley Dorje as the 17^th Karmapa, also thanking China for this. In the meantime, the monks loyal to Shamarpa were kept outside by force. Akong Tulku (1939-2013), a self-confessed overseas Tibetan recruit of the CCP's United Front Work Department (UFWD), and members of his Rokpa Foundation, were also present and seen bribing and agitating the monks in favour of Tai Situ.

As such, the takeover of Rumtek monastery in 1993 was accomplished through bribery and force. Those participating included corrupt Sikkim officials, agents of China, and even a minister of Taiwan’s government working for the interests of Beijing (i.e. Chen Li-an). Bhandari benefited from the largesse of Chen Li-an and allowed his illegal entry into Sikkim, according to local media reports. Chen Li-an and his paramour Sun Chun-hua (d. 2017) were actually caught in 1993, smuggling an amount in excess of U.S. $1.5 million in cash. The Indian government’s ban on Chen Li-an references “objectionable activities during the clandestine visit to Sikkim in December 1993.”

Banishment of Tai Situ from India

In September 1994 Tai Situ was banned from India on the grounds of “anti-India activities.” His agitprop activities in the monasteries situated along the disputed northern areas between Sikkim and China was taken into account in this ban, especially his activities in the Karma Kagyu Monastery of Phodong. Prior to this, he had been caught smuggling a quantity of gold in Delhi on 29 October 1986 and was apprehended by Indian customs at Calcutta airport in February 1993, also with gold. He was released thanks to his Bhutanese diplomatic passport. The then-classified report No. SM/4(2)/CS/ by Sikkim chief secretary K. Sreedhar Rao to the Indian Cabinet (dated 24 May 1997) confirmed Tai Situ's willing subordination to the Chinese government.

It is important to note that at that very moment, China was engaged in diplomatic negotiations with India regarding the Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh border issue, which culminated in the signing of the “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,” on 7 September 1993. Notwithstanding this agreement, China remained the only country in the world which refused to acknowledge the merger of Sikkim with India of 1975. In fact, the Chinese corridor between Sikkim and Bhutan is of key strategic military importance for China. For, if Beijing controls this “tri-junction” area, it would give the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a direct access to the narrow “Siliguri chicken’s neck,” facilitating the blockage of Indian access to the eastern states, where Arunachal Pradesh is still claimed by China as part of its territory.

This aspect of the Karmapa appointment by China can reasonably be seen, among other things, as an effective seed of influence over Sikkim’s population, in favour of Chinese military interests. The huge military reinforcement of the Nathu La Pass, as well as the wish of China to swap other disputed areas in Northern Bhutan for part of the Doklam Plateau, all point in the same direction.

Tai Situ’s ban was imposed due to the suspicion held by Indian security services of his collusion with China. This was a sovereign decision of state taken by the Union Home Minister of India at the time, S. B. Shankarao Chavan. Undersecretary Arvind Verma signed the ban.

The counter-reaction however was political, managed by local politicians and the Tibetan Government in Exile. The late high-profile lawyer and politician Ram Jethmalani (1923-2019), a loyal friend of Tai Situ, had held ministerial posts during the 1990s. Jethmalani used his considerable influence to have the ban revoked. The ban was partially lifted in August 1998 by the Union Home Secretary, with Tai Situ still being forbidden to enter Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Jammu & Kashmir.

With Tai Situ’s return to India, security concerns still remained. The Indian Home Ministry decided that if Tai Situ left India, he would not be allowed to return. Restrictions placed on his movements inside India were severe and any attempts for him to leave the country were prevented for the subsequent 17 years (his first trip outside India after his re-admission in 1998 would not occur until 2016). The story of Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s appointment and the subsequent ban of Tai Situ confirms that Indian security was at risk.

It should be noted that each of the above crises have concerned criminal and security issues, as well political and geopolitical interests. In fact, the whole story of Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s life has been defined by such matters; behind the religious narrative there has always been a political or geopolitical agenda.

It was precisely due to his long-standing relationship with the Chinese authorities that Tai Situ’s return to India was a necessary precondition for the next disruption, which was the exfiltration of Ogyen Trinley Dorje into India. This would require a change in strategy at the level of the Indian Government, which would happen after the election in March 1998 which saw Atal Vajpayee become Prime Minister of India.

Exfiltration into India

The official narrative of Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s arrival in India in the early days of 2000 is a replica of the Dalai Lama’s flight into exile in 1959. The reality however is closer to that of a kidnapping, organised with the participation of the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE), the U.S., and Tai Situ (who by this time had returned to India).

The operation took the form of an elaborate double-cross. China’s original intent seems to have been to covertly allow Ogyen Trinley Dorje, with the support of Tai Situ’s network from the Indian side, to leave China temporarily in order to retrieve religious relics such as the famous Black Crown from Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim. However, Ogyen Trinley Dorje was surprised not to be able to fulfil this mission, when his journey unexpectedly ended in Dharamsala and he was placed under the control of the TGiE and the scrutiny of the Indian security services.

To say a few words about this trip, echoed and amplified by the media as Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s independent “escape,” it should be recalled that the different versions provided by his entourage and finally by himself, were far from credible. It was first claimed that he trekked into India through the mountains, undetected by Chinese authorities, which is physically impossible in the middle of the harsh Himalayan winter.  Then it was proposed that, after leaving the tranquil Tsurphu Monastery in a noisy four-wheel drive car without alerting a single guard, his small group crossed seven bridges unnoticed by the troops controlling them around-the-clock. Then they were supposed to have proceeded through Nepal and crossed the Indian border somewhere near Gorakhpur in eastern Uttar Pradesh.  In reality, it was a professionally planned and funded operation, following specific itineraries, and using pre-arranged means of transport including a helicopter. It required substantial time and infrastructure to prepare.

The operation to derail the Chinese mission could not have proceeded without the co-operation and financial support of the U.S., a fact illustrated by the involvement of CIA-linked individuals and entities active in the Himalayan region, specifically Nepal. For example, Fishtail Air, which provided the helicopter to air-lift Ogyen Trinley Dorje from Mustang to Kathmandu, was known to be an “old CIA proprietary airline.”

American authorities and the TGiE were certainly part of it, as well as Tai Situ’s team with the backing of Chen Li-an, who was recorded by one of the major dailies in Taiwan, China Times, announcing a few weeks in advance that Ogyen Trinley Dorje was about to arrive in Rumtek. The Dalai Lama swore that he knew nothing about the exfiltration, which is hard to believe. Was it a mere premonition that he presided over one whole afternoon session on 20 December, during the 1999 Kagyu Monlam in Bodhgaya led by Bokar Rinpoche, and gave a special transmission of a non-sectarian Monlam liturgy that he composed corresponding perfectly to the situation of a Karmapa living in an institution of the Dalai Lama’s Gelug sect (i.e. Gyuto Monastery, where Ogyen Trinley Dorje would find himself languishing for the next 17 years)?

The Indian intelligence services and military were quite vexed to be the last informed. They knew perfectly well that the official narratives were too theatrical to be true, so they decided to put him under de-facto house arrest status that would last for years. Even his sister Ngodup Palzom, who miraculously entered India some weeks before him without arousing the slightest suspicion from Chinese authorities, was barred entry to Sikkim (although there was some confusion about whether this was under the influence of the TGiE administration or directly by the Indian authorities).

How could the exfiltrators have been so naïve as to think that the Indian security services would have believed such an utterly incredible “escape” tale? Maybe they sincerely believed that the Indian Prime Minister would, as Nehru had done with the Dalai Lama, welcome Ogyen Trinley Dorje? Of course, the dream of making a triumphal entry into Rumtek also quickly vanished. Many questions were – and still are – pending answers. The most obvious is the supposed destination of the trip. If Ogyen Trinley Dorje had wished only to go to Rumtek, then instead of reaching Dharamsala as his final destination, why didn’t he go to Rumtek in the first place?

What came to light later is the fact that Ogyen Trinley Dorje passed through Mustang (where the CIA trained Tibetan guerrillas up to the 1970s) after being chased by Chinese border police. With a pony, drivers and guides waiting for them, they bypassed Jomsom where the Nepali police were waiting for them. They were then greeted at Manang Pedi (at an altitude of 3,535 metres) by a party of four (two Westerners and two Tibetans) who were brought by an Écureuil air-rescue helicopter belonging to Fishtail Air, which then took them to Kathmandu. According to ABC, an American official from the U.S. State Department gave his approval for the involvement of Fishtail Air as early as October 1999. 

Was China in agreement with such a departure? Perhaps not as a matter of collective decision. Considering the internal power struggles in Beijing, it is highly plausible that high-ranking security officials, perhaps in military circles, perceived the departure to be in China’s long-term interest, and decided at least not to block it. Such an long-term interest is easy to identify: because of the Dalai Lama’s backing of Ogyen Trinley Dorje, he would come to be seen as his “spiritual heir” and this legitimacy would magnetise towards him the devotion of all the Dalai Lama’s followers, including Westerners and the media. If he could be kept loyal to China (which he has proven to be up until now), when the Dalai Lama passes away, he would deliver all this Sinicized collected faith on a silver platter to Beijing.

Some argue that it would be contradictory to see the Dalai Lama and China working together on such an issue. However, what they forget is that the Dalai Lama does not claim any secession from Beijing rule, but rather a model similar to Hong Kong (and possibly Taiwan), known as “One Country Two Systems.” And who oversees Buddhist communities both in Hong Kong and Taiwan if not the Buddhist Association of China and the United Front Work Department? According to an early interview given by Prof. Robert Thurman to the New York Times, the Chinese did agree to allow Ogyen Trinley Dorje to travel and receive teachings abroad, when he was only 9 years old (in 1994). This coincides with the first year of involvement by the team of Chen Li-an at Tsurphu. Thurman adds that Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s family was also promised to be able to travel and could not wait to go to India. In the same interview, Thurman reported that “His father, a hardy nomad, was wearing a big Dalai Lama button, and was going on and on with me about how he wanted to go to India.”

In other words, there must have been a promise of clearance from at least some segment of the Chinese authorities regarding such a trip, showing that the project was known perfectly well and monitored by them. It was precisely because everybody (except India) had an interest in this fictitious escape, that it was made possible. While India’s security establishment and bureaucracy later managed to counteract the narrative of the “escape” to some extent, it seems that at the time, the Vajpayee government turned a blind eye and allowed it to proceed as planned.

Geopolitical Interests

It should be understood that this happened in the context of tensions in India’s foreign relations arising from the 1998 nuclear tests and recently elected PM Vajpayee’s declaration of India as a fully-fledged nuclear state. The U.S. condemned India for this and imposed economic sanctions. China also issued condemnations and rejected India's stated rationale of needing nuclear capabilities to counter a Chinese threat as “totally unreasonable.”

Vajpayee’s calculation here may have been to simultaneously appease both China and the U.S. As with numerous other important matters in India’s relationship with its long-time rival, Vajpayee was eager to placate the Chinese, perhaps to persuade the PRC to halt its “cartographic aggression” in showing three Indian states within its territory. U.S. interests could be satisfied to some extent by allowing them to proceed with setting the stage for a successor to the Dalai Lama in the exile Tibetan movement.

Reactions

The reaction of the international media to Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s arrival was one of great approval, sealing his legitimacy in the portrayal of a daring escape, and disregarding the concerns of the Indian security establishment of his being a Chinese agent. The ensuing media furore was the starting point for a series of books and movies which fortified the official narrative.

Despite the reaction of the media being as expected, the same was not true of Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s life, once in India. The Indian bureaucracy and security apparatus kept him under house arrest, drawing the ire of local political groups which continuously pressurised India’s central government to allow him into Sikkim.

The Chinese government did not overreact in their management of this crisis, stating that he is still loyal and that he will return to China. This lack of surprise shows that they were anticipating the matter, and that they could continue to maintain control over him. This was demonstrated by the fact that some of the people organising for him on the Chinese side of the border (i.e. Khenpo Tengye and Miao Rong from the team of Chen Li-an) eventually reappeared on the Indian side, in very influential positions. 

The reaction of the U.S., in concert with the TGiE, was to put pressure on the Indian government to grant him refugee status, which it eventually did in February 2001.

Control of Assets in China

A letter signed and sealed in May 2005 by Ogyen Trinley Dorje and Tai Situ granted power of attorney over the management of the two main monasteries of his Karma Kagyu sect in Tibet, Tsurphu and Palpung, to Dongbao Zhongba. Zhongba is a former military officer re-purposed as a Karma Kagyu tulku, who serves as a member of China’s legislature, the CPPCC, as the Kagyu sect’s formal representative.

According to his official biography “a representative from the Karma Kagyu Association” was sent to Zhongba on behalf of Ogyen Trinley Dorje and Tai Situ to pass on their request for him to take responsibility for these monasteries. However, given that a rare photograph exists of Zhongba in the private quarters of Ogyen Trinley Dorje in India in May 2005, it is reasonable to conclude that Zhongba came in person to Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s premises near Dharamsala to receive this authorisation, with his personal seal.

As such Ogyen Trinley Dorje, while resident in India and under its protection as a refugee, coordinated with Beijing for a political purpose, continuing to oversee his sect’s estates in Tibet as if he were in China in person. Zhongba is one of the most trusted assets of China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the state-controlled Buddhist Association of China (BAC) and has played a pivotal role in the Sinicization of Tibetan religion and culture. Understanding Zhongba’s duties in the delegation of authority to him by Ogyen Trinley Dorje from abroad, it is evident that their cooperation has enabled the implementation of a Sinicized Tibetan Buddhism within China. This arrangement made between Ogyen Trinley Dorje, Tai Situ and Zhongba was not widely publicised outside of China.

Zhongba wasted no time in leveraging the authority invested in him by Ogyen Trinley Dorje to spread China’s control. Not only over Karma Kagyu institutions, but later to oversee the forced conversion of monasteries of the Drukpa sect in the Kailash region into Karma Kagyu, much to the chagrin of the head of the Drukpa sect, the Gyalwang Drukpa. By 2014 the results of this collaboration had become so intolerable to Gyalwang Drukpa that he tried to expose the transgression, but by then it was too late.

Collapse of "Regency" Role

On 3 April 2010, the personal office of Ogyen Trinley Dorje was informed by the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE) of the Indian government’s decision to decline his request to travel abroad on a planned trip to Europe. In July that year, the Indian authorities maintained this decision, also prohibiting him from travelling to the U.S. The news was immediately met with an aggressive signature campaign by his Western followers, addressed to Indian Congress president Sonia Gandhi, decrying India for contravening “fundamental principles to the preservation of human dignity and respect for universal, fundamental and ethical principles.”

The decision to decline his request to travel abroad came as a surprise to some, given that two years previously he had been permitted to leave India for the first time since his arrival, visiting the U.S. from 15 May – 2 June 2008.

Why did India refuse to allow him to leave in 2010? Could it have been that India was not happy with his “coming out” in favour of the Sinicization of Tibetan religion or the stream of Beijing’s envoys such as Ching Yao (who in 2009 opened a route of liaison with the BAC), the televangelist Hai Tao, Dongbao Zhongba etc. etc. believing him to be under Chinese control? This seems unlikely, because if it were the case, the Indian government could have intervened or prevented these contacts from happening. In fact, it appears to be not until much later that the Indian authorities began to grasp the gravity of these developments.

Could it have been that after the furore over the Dalai Lama’s November 2009 visit to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian government wanted to please the Chinese by complying with requests not to let him travel? This seems equally unfeasible.

How then can this refusal be understood in light of his previous visit to the U.S.? In fact, the 2008 visit was an exception from the point of view of India and must be seen in the context of the interests of the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE).

Thus, at the time of his first visit to the U.S. in 2008, during the administration of George W. Bush, while there was still no question of the Dalai Lama retiring from his duties, pressure was building on him revoke the Ganden Phodrang system. As such, at this moment it served the interests of the Dalai Lama’s administration and of the U.S. to promote the idea of Ogyen Trinley Dorje as a potential successor who could play a leadership role in the interim “regency” between the death of the current Dalai Lama and the appointment of the next one.

Ogyen Trinley Dorje was received in the U.S. in 2008 with a well-organised PR and media campaign. Time Magazine declared him “The World's Next Top Lama” and the American mainstream media all followed suit. In Manhattan’s famous Hammerstein Ballroom, he was introduced with musical accompaniment by American rock legend Lou Reed. While his star began to rise, in reality such a regency role was never seriously on the cards as his political loyalties were always in doubt.

As explained, the 2008 visit was an aberration from the perspective of the Indian government. In fact, the policy of India towards Ogyen Trinley Dorje under the premiership of Manmohan Singh between 2004 and 2014 had been consistent: that if he were to leave India, no assurances of his being allowed back into the country would be given; a nightmare that the TGiE wished to avoid at all costs. The TGiE must have negotiated guarantees from both the U.S. and India that he would be returned without incident if they agreed to his U.S. visit on this occasion.

The Obama Administration and China

Returning to the matter of India’s 2010 refusal of permission for Ogyen Trinley Dorje to travel abroad, in the intervening time, the election of Barack Obama had set a new trajectory for relations between the U.S. and the TGiE.

When the Dalai Lama came to the U.S. in October 2009, it was the first time in 18 years that he visited Washington, D.C. without meeting the U.S. President. The decision to break precedent was conveyed to the Dalai Lama the previous month, when Obama’s top adviser Valerie Jarrett, and Maria Otero, the State Department’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues travelled all the way to Dharamsala to meet with the Dalai Lama. Their official statement announced that the first meeting between President Obama and the Dalai Lama would only happen after the US-China Summit in Beijing that November had concluded, although other matters were certainly on the table.

However, it was India, not the U.S., that formally refused Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s request to travel in 2010. India’s refusal must therefore be seen in the context of the diplomatic leverage held by the U.S. By June 2010, the U.S. and India had agreed to formally re-engage in strategic dialogue and during his visit to India in that November Obama announced a $5 billion deal for military transport aircraft and F414 engines (making the U.S. one of India’s top three military suppliers). As such, it is reasonable to suppose that the Indian government would have been content to honour the Americans’ requirement to simply reinforce pre-existing restrictions on his movements.

The presence of Ogyen Trinley Dorje on the international stage during this time would only have complicated matters for the Obama White House and further disturbed the realignment of the relationship between the U.S. and China. Analysing the geopolitical interests at stake, it is clear to see that Washington D.C., New Delhi, and Dharamsala were all in-sync in the decision to refuse Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s request to travel abroad in 2010. Although he couldn’t make it in person in 2010, his sister Ngodup Palzom was sent as his representative, even appearing surreptitiously on a panel at a UN conference on women’s rights in Washington D.C., as well as meeting an as yet unidentified nephew in New York.

In the meantime, Beijing issued a timely reminder to Ogyen Trinley Dorje of his responsibilities. As soon as the decision to refuse his travel request was publicised, Padma Choling who had just been appointed as the TAR Chairman by Beijing, confessed in an interview to Newsweek Magazine: “The Karmapa and I are mates from the same hometown; I know him quite well (…) He said he will never betray his country, his people, his religion. We hope he keeps his promise.” Two big messages were transmitted here: a barely-veiled threat and a no less barely-veiled truth.

As a former officer of the PLA (1969-1986) not renowned for his sense of humour, to make his threat clear, Padma Choling slightly modified the famous CCP formula “love the country, love the religion” into “never betray” them and by inserting the mention of “his people.”

In other words, he told Ogyen Trinley Dorje that he held the fate of his family, but also their friends, in his hands.

After quashing the “Free Karmapa” signature campaign on 23 April to placate the Indian government, Ogyen Trinley Dorje turned his attention to issuing a response to Padma Choling, using the same channel, Newsweek. In an interview dated 28 April 2010, he confirmed without a trace of hesitation: “I left a letter to make sure this trip [from Tibet to India] wasn’t seen as political; I didn’t want my parents, family and friends to get hassled. (…) I don’t want to be the enemy of China; I don’t have the heart to hurt China. The Chinese did recognize me.” He even added that to be Karmapa, he “had to be approved (…) by the Chinese government.”

Money laundering scandal

In January 2011, a local Himachal Pradesh police operation seized over INR ₹60 million (about USD $777,000) in currencies of 25 countries including China, during raids on the offices of Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s “Karma Garchen Trust,” as well as discovering documents indicating an illegal “benami” land transaction. Initially, the police suspected that the money was being used to spread Chinese influence in India, and that he was a Chinese agent helping the Chinese government control Buddhist monasteries in India. Chinese SIM cards were also discovered in the raid of the monastery and further allegations were made by senior Indian officials of evidence having been found in recorded phone conversations that he had maintained close ties with China.

The ensuing media frenzy served to stoke Indians’ (especially Himachalis’) distrust of the exile Tibetan community, and news of the crisis spread worldwide, heaping shame upon Ogyen Trinley Dorje. The case would drag on in the years to come, and although he was initially cleared, the matter was allowed to hang over his head like a Damoclean Sword.

The Dalai Lama was obliged to dismiss suspicions of Ogyen Trinley Dorje being a Chinese agent and deflect any criticism of financial irregularities onto his aides in order to save face. The Himachal Pradesh state government did its best to calm the situation down, but at this most critical time, the erupting financial scandal tarnished the reputation of Ogyen Trinley Dorje to such a degree that he was no longer seen as acceptable as a “regent” in between the death of the current Dalai Lama and majority of the next.

On 24 February 2011, U.S. Ambassador Tim Roemer had a closed-door meeting with the Dalai Lama. One month later, on 25 March 2011, the 370-year-old tradition of the political role of the Dalai Lama formally ended. Under the changes, his political powers were formally transferred to an elected Prime Minister. The “Tibetan Government in Exile” became the “Central Tibetan Administration” (CTA), demanding no more autonomy than that offered by the Tibet Autonomous Region's constitution and supposedly ready to comply with the Chinese, so much so that the former role of Kalon Tripa (equivalent of “Prime Minister”) was eventually re-branded “Sikyong” which in Tibetan implies “political leader” but in Chinese (司政; sīzhèng) means “secretary”, i.e. an administrative, not political head. The problem with this rebranding to fit more with a Chinese than a Tibetan administration, is that the Chinese administration of Tibet already exists, without requiring a duplicate. So, while the name has changed, in practice it is a dream.

With the ceremonial funeral of the Ganden Phodrang, the Council of Regency, which traditionally handled Tibet’s government in the period between the death of one Dalai Lama and the completion of his successor’s education was also abolished, and along with it any possibility of Ogyen Trinley Dorje fulfilling such a role. After the punishment dealt to him by the financial scandal, he was punished a second time with the abolition of the regency. His supposed purpose, a narrative carefully built up since his arrival in India, had apparently vanished.

Once these changes had been implemented, the pressure from the U.S. to keep him out of the frame was gone. Then, perhaps as consolation for the previous year - and/or rehabilitation after his financial scandal - he was allowed to return to the U.S. briefly in July 2011. Attitudes in segments of the Indian security establishment were also softening. He appeared as a member of the entourage of the Dalai Lama on a visit to Washington D.C. for religious services and to meet the U.S. Tibetan community, but he certainly did not join the Dalai Lama in his meeting with Obama.

It should be noted that while in the U.S. Ogyen Trinley Dorje reconnected with Tsewang Tashi, a figure who played a very important role in his exfiltration at the turn of the century, who had later been barred from India under suspicion of working for the Chinese government. Tsewang would go on to become a key player in the U.S. in the coming years (detailed below).

Attempted recruitment by the U.S. 

From March-May 2015 Ogyen Trinley Dorje made his third visit to the U.S. This was a simpler matter than in the preceding years, as the election of Narendra Modi as India’s PM in 2014 had led to a change in strategy. A decision was reported to have been taken to review restrictions on his travel, in an attempt to “engage” him, i.e. to use him in support of Indian interests.

The 2015 U.S. tour featured several highly publicised engagements at no less than six prestigious universities: Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Wisconsin, Stanford, and Redlands. Honours were showered upon Ogyen Trinley Dorje. On 18 March the University of Redlands, CA, awarded him an Honorary Doctor of Humane Letters degree, “in recognition of his deep commitment to building a compassionate world by illuminating and encouraging the interconnections that unite us across differences of language, culture, religion or worldview.” According to the University’s effusive press release “…he models for us how the efforts of one person to work for environmental protection, gender justice and intentional use of resources in a consumer-driven globalized world inspires our entire University of Redlands community.” 

The red carpet rolled out in particular by the three “Ivy League” universities most openly associated with the U.S. intelligence community (Yale, Harvard, and Princeton) should be appreciated in the context of the parallel invitation extended to meet with high-profile members of the American security establishment in Washington, D.C., the purpose of which cannot be understood as anything other than a proposal to cooperate with them.

Despite preceding overtures by Indian security representatives on one hand and Chinese power on the other, he decided not to refuse the U.S. outreach, and during his visit was fêted in Washington, D.C. by several key officials, including Sarah Sewall, then Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues (a key architect of the Obama Administration’s preventive approach to “combating violent extremism” abroad); Nancy Lindborg, President of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a federal institution involved in conflicts around the world, described as a funding conduit and clearing house for research on U.S. strategies of “low intensity conflict”; and Diane Feinstein, Senior Democrat Senator and at the time Vice Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The visit was clearly an Establishment affair, with an overtly political purpose.

Ogyen Trinley Dorje would return to the U.S. in 2017, via the U.K. and Canada, ostensibly for a series of pastoral engagements during the summer. In an interview with the Sunday Times he complained about how he wished he could have a private house in India but couldn't because only Indian citizens are allowed to buy land. He mentioned the pain of missing his family, and stated that "Being Karmapa was a path chosen for me. It is sometimes overwhelming, but it’s my life.” While abroad, he released a video via Facebook expressing his hope that "within the next two or three years” he would go to Tibet to meet his parents before they pass away. 

Back in India, pressure from activist groups to bring him to Sikkim had reached boiling point, with thousands of protestors taking to the streets of Gangtok, the capital of the sensitive border state Sikkim, waving placards such as “Are We Indian? Now We Doubt” and “Is Sikkim not a Part of India?” After several months abroad, rumours started to circulate that he was not intending to return to India. A number of unsuccessful outreach efforts were made by representatives of the CTA, including a personal visit to New York by its President Lobasang Sangay, to lure him back.

Dominican Citizenship

At the moment the Indian government offered to welcome him back, provide him land in Delhi, and finally let him go to Sikkim, Ogyen Trinley Dorje declined. One could have supposed that he would have opted for U.S. citizenship (which had been offered to him since 2000), but he did not go further in that direction. Instead, he benefited from the decisive influence of China over the micro-state of the Commonwealth of Dominica (population 70,000), successfully applying for citizenship of the Caribbean island through its “Citizen by Investment” (CBI) programme, while misleading the Indian government and the CTA as to his intentions.

Diplomatic relations were established between Dominica and the PRC in 2004 after China pledged $122 million in assistance and its newly elected Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit unilaterally withdrew his country's recognition of Taiwan. Since that time, the two countries embarked upon a relationship which appears only to be at the highest level. Dominica is actively pursuing high net-worth Chinese, for the country's CBI economic passport program, and China has established its footprint on the island with the construction of a sizeable embassy complex, disproportionately large for its official function given the negligible international trade, tourism, or exchange between the two countries.

It has been asserted that the majority of Dominica CBI passport holders are Chinese nationals, and it is likely that many of these supposedly “private businessmen” from China are in fact intelligence agents engaged in espionage in the U.S. 

Thanks to China, for a nation with no external or domestic national security threats, Dominica has developed military capabilities that far exceed its law enforcement needs. In 2017, Dominica was granted military aid worth U.S. $3 million. While Dominica has not had a standing army since 1981, it does have a large paramilitary unit known as the Special Service Unit (SSU), a response team attached to the Dominican Police. China has supplied arms & ammunition, and even camouflage uniforms and equipment, to the SSU, and in 2017 armoured cars and other military vehicles arrived in Dominica, courtesy of a multi-million-dollar grant from the PRC.

The SSU provides security for the large Chinese Embassy, whose construction is said to have cost U.S. $20 million and was strictly limited to a Chinese crew. The embassy, under diplomatic cover, is likely being used by the PRC as a protected listening post, focused upon the East Caribbean region and the U.S., to conduct electronic surveillance of communications in the region and gather intelligence through human assets. The embassy serves to exercise and expand China’s influence, furthering its global ambitions.

Dominica offers citizenship in exchange for an investment into the country's economy. Since 2014, applicants can make a U.S. $200,000 minimum investment in pre-approved real estate. By 2016 this had become the main source of foreign direct investment into Dominica (valued at 16% of the government's total revenue). Dominican citizens can travel without a visa, or obtain a visa upon entry, to nearly 140 countries and territories, including the United Kingdom and the Schengen Zone.

In 2018, Ogyen Trinley Dorje received Dominica citizenship. However it is unclear exactly how he proved his identity to Dominica's CBI Unit. It can be inferred that Beijing supported, or at least cleared his application. What is known is that at the time of Dominica’s granting him citizenship, he was being closely taken care of by his network of overseas Chinese in the U.S.

The two people closest to him from the start of his unexpected stay in the U.S. having finally departed India in 2017 were (i) Lama Tsultrim, resident lama of Karma Thegsum Choling (KTC) in New Jersey, and (ii) Tsewang Tashi, founder of the Danang Foundation based in Flushing, NY. Both are long-term residents of the U.S. (Tsewang since 2000 and Tsultrim since 2002, presumably naturalised U.S. citizens). Both accompanied Ogyen Trinley Dorje during his exfiltration into India.

Upon his arrival in India, Lama Tsultrim served for two years as an assistant to Ogyen Trinley Dorje. In 2002 he assumed the position of Resident Lama of KTC, described as “a U.S. residence” of Ogyen Trinley Dorje. KTC, a secluded estate located in the New Jersey pinelands was gifted by an overseas Chinese couple, Mr. and Mrs. Frank Lin, who are involved in real estate. It is here that Ogyen Trinley Dorje was based through much of 2017 and 2018. KTC caters to a congregation almost exclusively comprising overseas Chinese.

Tsewang Tashi was among the first cohort of students at Nechung College, established in Tibet in 1982 under the auspices of the state-run Buddhist Association of China (BAC) and the politically rehabilitated 10th Panchen Lama. As such, at the time of Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s departure from China in late 1999, Tsewang was definitely a controlled religious civil servant. 

Just prior to Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s arrival in the U.S. in 2017, an interview with Tsewang was published in Ming Jing News (belonging to Chinese media group Mirror Media based in Canada with bureaux in the U.S., Hong Kong and Taiwan). In the interview, Tsewang spoke of their relationship and the circumstances of the escape to India in 1999. He proclaimed that they “used as modes of transportation cars, horses, and helicopter, and this came without support from the American CIA, the exile Tibetan government, or the Chinese government” and “The helicopter was also rented with their private names and they did not receive any help.”

Tsewang also explained that in July 2000 the Indian government gave the party of six “escapees” refugee cards and exit passports. Tsewang travelled to Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore, but upon his return he was stopped at the airport and prevented from re-entering India, because the Indian Foreign Ministry (correctly) suspected he was sent by the Chinese government. Unable to resolve the issue, he was detained for five days before being given the option to return either to Taiwan or China, so he chose Taiwan. Two months later, the Dalai Lama intervened to arrange for the U.S. State Department to issue a visa for Tsewang.

From the start, Tsewang worked with the Chinese, being the key individual on the ground in Tibet who coordinated the exfiltration of Ogyen Trinley Dorje into India in the final days of 1999.

The small administrative episode of Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s acquisition of Dominican citizenship provides a backlight on the role of Tsewang during that first escape. If Tsewang is indeed the one who he turned to for help during this second “escape” (i.e. from India) due to his Chinese network, then he presumably would have had to provide the relevant Chinese identity papers for Ogyen Trinley Dorje. If Tsewang had the capacity to do so this time, he also must have held this responsibility earlier during the exfiltration in 1999. This can be explained by the highest concern he held to protect the life of Ogyen Trinley Dorje within Chinese territory during the first escape. That is to say, had the escape party faced arrest within China, Tsewang would have necessarily been able to provide the relevant papers to the Chinese authorities, and furthermore even to keep them in his possession in the years that followed.

Whatever the case, it is fair to surmise that if Ogyen Trinley Dorje was not a tool of China, he would not have been granted his Dominican passport.

It is difficult to imagine that Tsewang was sophisticated enough to manage the acquisition of the Dominican passport without the knowledge of the Chinese authorities. Tsewang was the case officer before and appears to have reprised this role. The story of the Dominican passport indicates some kind of an arrangement with Beijing, and the extent of China’s influence in Dominica only adds further credence to such a conclusion: Ogyen Trinley Dorje’s Dominican passport is the symbolic equivalent of a Chinese one.

It is noteworthy that his first trip on this new travel document was to visit Trinley Thaye Dorje in France, accompanied by Lama Tsultrim and Dilyak Drupon, the Director of Kagyu Monlam Ltd which manages the offshore assets connected with Ogyen Trinley Dorje's activities.

Meeting with Trinley Thaye Dorje

In October 2018, Ogyen Trinley Dorje travelled to France to meet with Trinley Thaye Dorje. After four days of private talks, they released a joint statement which astonished the Buddhist world. In it, they committed themselves to working together “to strengthen the Karma Kagyu lineage and heal the division”. With this single move, the entire construct of the “rival/fake Karmapa” system, sealed by the Dalai Lama and peddled for 25 years, was demolished; and with it a major tool of negotiation advantage in determining the successor to the Dalai Lama was lost.

From a spiritual perspective, the Dalai Lama lost legitimacy, as his recognition of Ogyen Trinley Dorje and conferral of monastic vows constituted a type of sacred bond known in Tibetan as “samaya,” which had now breached. From a political point of view, many who depended on Ogyen Trinley Dorje geopolitically (CTA President Lobsang Sangay, Tai Situ and of course the Dalai Lama, among others) lost a major asset. While the media may continue endlessly with its theatre of wondering if he will be the Dalai Lama's "successor”, legally speaking the matter is closed. The authority of the Dalai Lama has been crushed, and the CTA has been deeply humiliated and left with no solution or alternative, with their entire business model collapsing and with no future figurehead in sight who could garner American sympathy and funds. The Trump administration hardly seems to care. Only China is left unscathed, and only from China’s perspective can this disruption be seen as a success.

However, Ogyen Trinley Dorje has no “samaya” with the CCP, who will only lose out in the event that he decides to renounce his title, which – without Beijing’s acceptance – will certainly result in his neutralisation. If he wants to survive, he has no right to formally approve Trinley Thaye Dorje as the Karmapa, even though he has done so implicitly from the perspective of the Dalai Lama.

While New Delhi can be angry with Ogyen Trinley Dorje to some extent, having arrived too late and been rejected in their attempts to “engage” him, the CTA may be ready to take more extreme measures. He is now taking great care of his safety. Fearing to travel, he went into long term isolation in Germany.

Network Links

• Buddhist Association of China
  • Zhao Puchu
  • Dao Zhuren
  • Dongbao Zhongba
  • Ching Yao
  • Hai Tao
  • Chuan Xi
  • Su Quan
• State Administration for Religious Affairs
  • Ren Wuzhi
  • Yang Tongxiang
  • Chi Nai
  • Ye Xiaowen
• Hwayue Foundation
  • Chen Li-an
  • Sun Chun-hua
  • Chen Yu-ting
  • Miao Rong
  • Chen Yu-chuen
• Others
  • Loo Chooi Ting
  • Tai Situ
  • Thrangu Rinpoche
  • Tsewang Tashi
  • Bo Gangkar
  • Karma Chodrak
  • Dilyak Drupon

Relatives

• Chödo Karma Döndrub (father)
• Gazi Loga (mother)
• Tendzin Chodron (b. 1968, sister)
• Yeshe Rabsel (b.1965, brother)
• Tashi Yangtso (b.1970, sister)
• Kalzang Paldzom (b. 1972, sister)
• Ngodup Palzom (b.1977, sister)
• Dendzom (b.1980, sister)
• unidentified older brother
• Tsewang Rigdzin (b.1989, brother)